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Question 
What lessons are there on what has made mixed humanitarian coordination models (with two or 
multiple coexisting lead agencies) most successful? 
What lessons have we learnt about supporting the capacity of host governments and local 
authorities to lead on and coordinate a response to large-scale and/or protracted refugee or 
displacement response? 
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1. Overview  
The literature review found little evidence of successes in coordination of refugee responses 
involving multiple lead agencies. Rather, it identified some clear lessons to emerge from recent 
experience of refugee response coordination, in particular from the Syrian refugee crisis in 
Lebanon. While host governments are assigned primary responsibility for refugee responses in 
international law, they face many challenges and, in practice, it is aid agencies who lead these – 
often bypassing host state actors. The literature highlights the need to involve host states and 
stresses the importance of capacity building to support this.  
Key lessons to emerge in relation to inter-agency coordination are as follows: 
▪ Sharing leadership – The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has the 
global mandate to lead refugee responses, and has been forceful in asserting this. 
However, this can cause tensions with other agencies and undermine coordination. 
UNHCR needs to be willing to share leadership, particularly in sectors where other 
agencies have greater technical capacity and experience. 
▪ Coordinated assessments – Assessments are a vital part of any refugee response but, 
as seen in the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, multiple assessments by multiple 
agencies are detrimental (e.g. duplication of effort, assessment fatigue among 
beneficiaries, datasets that are not comparable). Coordinated assessments are needed 
conducted jointly, with consensus on information needs, sharing of data and findings, 
and establishment of countrywide monitoring systems. 
▪ Response coordination: sectoral working groups vs. clusters – UNHCR does not 
see the cluster approach as applicable to refugee responses and sets up its own 
sectoral working groups. However, often international agencies also set up clusters 
leading to parallel structures, duplication of effort and costs, and confusion among those 
familiar with the cluster approach. Ideally either sectoral working groups or clusters 
should be set up, not both. Clusters would appear more logical, but could be resisted by 
UNHCR. 
▪ UNHCR lead coordination role – UNHCR needs to make particular efforts to 
strengthen its coordination practice: promote positive attitudinal change within the 
agency towards coordination; deploy a corps of staff members with specific coordination 
skills to deploy in refugee emergencies; be more open to inter-agency secondments 
from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others; 
focus on information management and sharing, among and within sectors. 
▪ Inter-agency competition - The desire by humanitarian agencies to assert their own 
mandates, have their own programmes, and the rivalry and competition that exists 
between different actors in the humanitarian sector, undermine coordination of refugee 
responses. Agencies need to look beyond their narrow interests and work towards the 
wider goal of helping those in need through an effective refugee response.    
▪ Linking humanitarian and development responses – An initial focus on humanitarian 
responses during a refugee crisis can undermine longer-term development responses. 
The two need to be linked from the outset of an emergency, and response coordination 
mechanisms need to reflect this. Thus, for example, rather than setting up a new 
humanitarian coordination team (HCT) (as well as refugee response coordination body), 
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the existing UN Country Team (UNCT) should be capacitated to support humanitarian 
and development actions, thereby avoiding duplication of time, effort and costs.  
Concerns over lack of capacity and/or misuse of aid by affected host states mean that the ‘norm’ 
in international humanitarian assistance models has been ‘state avoidance’, with aid agencies 
taking the lead in refugee responses. Some wealthier developing countries are now asserting 
their lead role in responding to disasters, but capacity can still be a constraint. Key lessons to 
emerge in relation to supporting host state capacity to coordinate refugee responses are as 
follows:  
▪ The central government should lead coordination of emergency responses at the 
national level and support the involvement of municipalities in local and regional 
coordination frameworks; 
▪ Humanitarian actors should make a far greater effort to coordinate with local 
authorities at the onset of crises and as emergencies unfold over the longer-term; 
▪ The central government and humanitarian agencies should promote medium- and long-
term programmes through government-led response plans to ensure greater 
coordination; 
▪ Humanitarian agencies can strengthen national capacity in diverse ways, e.g. 
training, action research, coaching and mentoring, knowledge sharing through 
collaborative projects, community of practice approaches, and long-term supervision.  
▪ Where states are willing to take a lead role but face capacity issues, agencies need 
to adopt a ‘smart alignment’ approach, whereby they assess government capacity, 
develop strategies to build this, work in line with government priorities, and substitute or 
complement government capacity where there are gaps or weaknesses. 
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2. Inter-agency coordination lessons 
Sharing leadership 
Issue 
The lead mandate for responding to refugee crises rests with UNHCR: its Statute stipulates that 
it ‘shall assume the function of providing international protection…and of seeking permanent 
solutions for the problem of refugees’ (UNHCR, 2014: 4). It is also empowered to ‘invite the 
cooperation of the various specialised agencies’ in the performance of its mandate, but the latter 
remains with UNHCR – ‘in no situation, stand-alone refugee or mixed, can accountability for 
refugees and persons of concern be transferred to another UN entity or other actor’ (UNHCR, 
2014). Micinski and Weiss (2016: 2) note that UNHCR has, in addition to its role in relation to 
refugees, stretched this to include internally displaced persons (IDPs) and ‘has assumed the role 
of coordinator of the cluster response in emergencies’. However, other agencies do have 
important roles to play in refugee/humanitarian responses. The International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), for example, is – alongside UNHCR – the lead agency for refugee camp 
coordination and management. And UNHCR shares the lead with respect to emergency shelter 
with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 
UNHCR’s determination to preserve its leadership role in refugee responses can lead to tensions 
with other agencies, and undermine overall coordination and effectiveness. The agency was 
criticised for its role in the response to the Iraqi refugee crisis: ‘UNHCR has a distinctive “go it 
alone” culture, derived from its strong operational orientation, its mandated focus on a very 
specific population group, and its readiness to confront governments on protection and human 
rights issues that development-oriented agencies that work in close tandem with state structures 
find more awkward to address’ (Crisp et al, 2009: 48).   
Case study: refugee crisis in Lebanon 
Following the influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon, the refugee response was led by UNHCR 
consistent with both its mandate and its relatively rapid initial scale-up after the crisis. However, 
as well as the overall refugee response, UNHCR also assumed co-leadership in sectors where 
other agencies felt they had a competitive advantage. This was partly because other agencies 
faced initial constraints in deployments and operational delivery. However, Kelley (2017: 92) 
points out: ‘UNHCR could have more readily relinquished its co-leadership of these sectors as 
soon as its operational partners were able to take them on, and focused instead on areas in 
which UNHCR’s capacity and leadership are recognised: protection shelter and overall 
coordination of the refugee response. This would have helped to ease the tension and 
competition between agencies which characterised the early years of the response’. 
Lessons 
UNHCR needs to strengthen sharing leadership responsibilities with other UN 
agencies/humanitarian actors, in particular allowing those with greater technical capacity and 
experience to take the lead in specified sectors.  
5 
Coordinated assessments 
Issue 
Needs assessments provide the evidence basis for strategic planning, as well as the baseline 
information upon which monitoring systems rely. The timeliness and quality of assessments 
helps determine the effectiveness of any refugee response. It is important for agencies involved 
in a refugee response to carry out coordinated assessments in partnership with all humanitarian 
actors in order to identify the needs of refugees and host communities. Carrying out coordinated 
assessments helps address a number of recurring issues during emergencies (IASC, 2012):  
▪ Lack of capacity to validate and analyse assessment information in order to identify 
priorities and guide planning of the humanitarian response; 
▪ Certain populations or situations are over-assessed while others are never measured at 
all; 
▪ Assessment data is all too often insufficiently shared or used, and datasets from 
different assessments are not comparable; 
▪ There is insufficient time to aggregate data from multiple assessments, information 
needs are not sufficiently prioritised and data collection processes are cumbersome. 
The benefits if agencies coordinate assessments and use shared information management 
systems are enormous: ensuring solid inter-sectoral analysis during crises and therefore better 
decision-making and planning; increased coverage; efficient use of resources; reduced 
duplication of effort; minimising beneficiary ‘assessment fatigue’; promoting a shared vision of 
needs and priorities (IASC, 2012). 
Case study: Syrian refugee crisis 
An evaluation of assessments undertaken in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, both in Syria 
and in neighbouring countries (Lebanon and Jordan), found many of the problems highlighted 
above (SNAP, 2013):  
▪ Lack of coordination of assessment activities among humanitarian actors – as well as 
increasing quantity and scope of assessments, not all followed international standards; 
there was little joint analysis of results at a sector working group level; and information 
was not shared in a timely manner. Consequently the information available was often 
patchy, it was difficult to make comparisons between different sets of information, and 
information did not contribute to a country- or region-wide picture of needs. 
▪ Assessment fatigue among affected populations, especially where delivery of assistance 
was limited or non-existent – both in Syria and in refugee hosting countries. In Jordan, for 
example, assessment fatigue led to a significant number of refugees refusing to 
participate in assessments. Continuous assessments were necessary, however, because 
the situation was so dynamic. 
Lessons 
Drawing on the experience of assessments in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, the following 
recommendations for wider assessment practice emerge (SNAP, 2013: 2): 
▪ Assessment working groups in each country should actively encourage and foster a 
culture of coordination by: 
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o Agreeing on key information needs to be included in every assessment; 
o Encouraging the sharing of assessment plans, data and findings, at least among 
participating organisations; 
o Promoting and facilitating joint or harmonised assessments, wherever possible. 
▪ The establishment of countrywide monitoring systems would also contribute to a shared 
understanding of trends and patterns and reduce assessment fatigue among the 
population. 
Coordination mechanisms: refugee response sectoral groups vs. 
humanitarian clusters 
Issue 
UNHCR tends to establish sectoral groups under any refugee response it leads. These are 
separate from clusters and the cluster approach, which forms the basis of the international 
humanitarian coordination structure. ‘Refugee protection and assistance is linked to the finding of 
durable solutions, which goes beyond the coordination of an emergency and humanitarian 
assistance and the intended scope and timeframe of the cluster approach’ (UNHCR, 2014: 5). 
In practice, this can result in the establishment of both sectoral working groups under UNHCR’s 
refugee response and clusters. Often the former mirror the latter. This leads to obvious problems 
of duplication, inefficiency in use of resources and time, and confusion on the part of 
humanitarian agencies and other actors. ‘For a new generation of humanitarian personnel who 
have become accustomed to working in the Cluster Approach, UNHCR’s leadership role in 
refugee settings is not always understood or appreciated’ (Crisp et al, 2013: 8). For its part, 
UNHCR sees attempts by the international community to introduce the cluster approach into 
refugee operations as something that ‘would serve to dilute and ultimately undermine the 
international refugee protection regime’ (Crisp et al, 2013: 8). Consequently, it ‘generally seeks to 
underscore its preeminent leadership and coordination role in refugee settings’.  
Case studies: Lebanon and South Sudan 
As part of its response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, UNHCR set up eight sectoral 
working groups. These mirrored the clusters set up under the Humanitarian Country Team 
(HCT). Little (2014) is highly critical of UNHCR’s approach: ‘While UNHCR is certainly mandated 
to lead/coordinate refugee responses, introducing a sectoral response (different from the cluster 
system largely in name only) caused confusion and delays amongst humanitarian actors more 
familiar with a cluster approach refined in recent crises’. It also added to costs. Little claims that, 
of the USD 881 million mobilised for the refugee response in 2013, only 50-60% of this was 
converted into assistance and/or services that reached the beneficiary end user ‘with the balance 
likely to have been absorbed by a range of in and out of country administration/operating costs’ 
(Little, 2014: 2). 
In response to the influx of Sudanese refugees into South Sudan in 2011-12, UNHCR – 
consistent with its perception that the cluster approach did not apply to refugee situations – set 
up a parallel coordination structure covering the same key sectors, e.g. WASH, health, 
education. ‘This dual coordination structure led to a duplication of efforts, with the same issues 
being discussed at various meetings’ (Begum, 2013: 13). Moreover, ‘UNHCR’s partners in the 
refugee response were used to working within the cluster coordination system and did not 
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understand UNHCR’s role as lead agency coordinating the refugee response’ (Begum, 2013: 
13). This caused uncertainty among agencies about standards of operating and coordination. 
Lessons 
A key lesson that could be derived from the experience of having parallel sectoral groups under a 
UNHCR-led refugee response and clusters would be to have one or the other. Adopting a cluster 
approach would appear more logical, given the wide familiarity with this among humanitarian 
agencies. But reconciling this with UNHCR’s perception of its unique mandate could be 
problematic.  
Other recommendations specifically for UNHCR to strengthen its coordination practice are as 
follows (Crisp et al, 2013: 8): 
▪ Attitudinal change is needed, an outcome that could be attained by means of intensive 
training, particularly for new emergency operations. At the same time, positive attitudes 
and approaches towards coordination should be explicitly modelled, expected, monitored 
and rewarded by senior managers; 
▪ UNHCR should develop a corps of staff members with specific coordination skills who 
can be deployed in refugee emergencies. The organization should also make itself more 
open to inter-agency secondments from OCHA, other UN bodies and NGOs; 
▪ UNHCR should give particular attention to the issue of information management and 
sharing, among and within the sectors. Information management plays an increasingly 
central role in relation to inter-agency coordination and is critical to the development of an 
effective collective response to a crisis.   
Inter-agency competition 
Issue 
The desire by humanitarian agencies to assert their own mandates, follow their own approaches 
and have their own programmes, and the rivalry and competition that exists between different 
actors in the humanitarian sector, undermine coordination of refugee responses.    
Case study: refugee crisis in Lebanon 
The refugee response to the crisis in Lebanon has involved multiple UN and other agencies. 
Mansour (2017: 2) makes a number of criticisms of their role in relation to coordination:  
▪ The politicization of humanitarian funding in response to the Syrian conflict has had a 
negative impact on coordination between the major international humanitarian actors. For 
their part, UN agencies and international humanitarian organizations appear more 
focused on winning big contracts than drawing up and implementing effective strategies 
to coordinate the humanitarian response to the Syrian conflict and its consequences in 
Lebanon. 
▪ The legacy of tension and power struggles among UN agencies, on the one hand, and 
between UN agencies and external international organizations, on the other, hinders 
coordination. Internal dynamics and the double or even triple hatting of some agencies 
has further exacerbated that struggle and made coordination more difficult still. 
▪ There is a consensus among international humanitarian actors that coordination is 
necessary among the different organizations providing assistance. However, the 
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understanding of what coordination entails and the extent to which it should be prioritized 
varies significantly from organization to organization. 
Lessons 
UNHCR and other agencies need to make a ‘genuine’ commitment to coordination in refugee 
responses, based on appreciation of the fact that this is vital for ensuring effective help to 
refugees as well as affected host populations. They need, in other words, to think beyond their 
own narrow interests and look at what is best for the wider purpose of helping those in need. 
Implementing this in practice, however, will be challenging. 
Coordinating humanitarian and development responses 
Issue 
UNHCR has a mandate to lead refugee responses, but responsibility for longer-term 
development rests with other UN agencies (and other development agencies) such as UNDP. 
There is increasing recognition that humanitarian and development responses need to be linked, 
and from the early stages of a refugee crisis rather than once it becomes protracted. Initially 
focusing largely on provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees can undermine longer-term 
development efforts. Crisp et al (2009: 48) note that: ‘UNHCR has a tendency to assume a 
leading role when an emergency erupts, and at a time when the situation has a high degree of 
visibility and when funding is readily available. But as time passes by and the situation becomes 
a progressively protracted one, UNHCR expects other members of the UN system to step in and 
to assume responsibility for the longer-term dimensions of the programme. “By then,” in the 
words of one UN partner in the region, “it is too late.”’ 
Case study 
As well as the refugee response with its eight sectoral working groups led by UNHCR in 
Lebanon, two further coordination mechanisms were established: a) a Humanitarian Country 
Team (HCT) consisting of UN agencies, IOM, NGO representatives and others, including later 
donors, all led by the Humanitarian Coordinator; and b) the UN Country Team (UNCT) 
responsible for the longer-term development response.  
As noted earlier, there were strong parallels between the sectoral groups established by UNHCR 
and the clusters under the HCT. The decision to set up a HCT rather than reorient the work of 
the UNCT to strengthen Lebanese institutions and support communities affected by the Syrian 
crisis has also been criticised (Kelley, 2017: 92). It led, for example, to agencies having to attend 
separate and frequent HCT and UNCT meetings, often covering the same agenda items. The 
additional HCT layer ‘depleted the already stretched time and resources of humanitarian and 
development partners’ (Kelley, 2017: 93). Eventually, coordination mechanisms were 
consolidated with UNHCR leading the refugee response and UNDP on the resilience and 
stabilisation side.  
Lessons 
A key lesson is that in humanitarian emergencies the existing UNCT should be capacitated to 
holistically support a country with its humanitarian and development challenges: ‘this would 
prevent duplication and reflect the growing consensus that humanitarian and development 
actions should be linked from the outset of an emergency’ (Kelley, 2017: 93). 
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3. Coordination initiatives 
While there is clearly scope for improvements in refugee response coordination, it is relevant to 
note that several initiatives in this regard have been undertaken recently. 
Refugee Coordination Model (RCM)  
In December 2013 UNHCR issued the Refugee Coordination Model (RCM) which provides a 
framework for leading, coordinating and delivering refugee operations. ‘It articulates and 
consolidates coordination practices with the goal of achieving the best possible protection of and 
assistance to refugees and addresses situations where large-scale responses require UNHCR’s 
support and that of international humanitarian actors’ (UNHCR, 2014: 1).The aim is to make 
refugee coordination more predictable, inclusive and collaborative.    
The standard elements of the RCM are as follows (UNHCR, 2013):  
▪ Direct advocacy on all international protection matters with the host Government by the 
UNHCR Representative.  
▪ Strategic planning for all phases of the response led by the Representative with 
operational partners in the development of a protection and solutions strategy, including 
development actors.  
▪ An inclusive Refugee Consultation Forum at national level, co-chaired by the 
Government (wherever possible) and the Representative, on the overall refugee 
response.  
▪ A UNHCR Refugee Coordinator to lead and coordinate a multi-sectorial response and 
ensure participation of sector-leads and all players at the field level, supported by a 
Multi-sector Operations Team with expertise and capacity to facilitate needs 
assessment, planning, monitoring, reporting and information management across all 
sectors.  
▪ A UNHCR-led Refugee Protection Working Group responsible for the coordination of 
protection services and for mainstreaming protection throughout other operational 
sectors.  
▪ Service-delivery sectors, led by Government line ministries and/or (co)chaired by 
partners and/or UNHCR. Sectors are intended to connect to Government-led 
development mechanisms, if feasible.  
▪ Arrangements on sector coordination and delivery with multiple potential partners, to 
ensure a predictable response. Agencies may wish to draw upon Global Cluster 
resources to support the delivery of services.  
UNHCR stresses that the RCM is ‘designed to be compatible with the other coordination 
mechanisms such as the cluster approach and other humanitarian and development systems’ 
(UNHCR, 2014: 1). 
In 2014 UNHCR and UNOCHA issued a joint note on coordination in mixed situations where a 
Humanitarian Coordinator has been appointed and a UNHCR-led refugee operation is also 
underway. The note (UNHCR & OCHA, 2014) details the division of responsibilities between the 
two agencies in relation to leadership, strategic planning, operational coordination, delivery, 
resource mobilisation and advocacy. 
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Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) 
On 19 September 2016, at the UN Summit on Addressing Large Scale Movements of Refugees 
and Migrants, 193 Member States unanimously adopted the New York Declaration, expressing 
their commitment to a comprehensive refugee response framework (CRRF) in the event of 
significant or large-scale movements of people seeking international protection, as well as 
protracted refugee situations (Turk & Garlick, 2016). Consistent with its mandate and past 
practice, the initiation of a comprehensive arrangement, whenever a relevant situation arises, 
would lie with UNHCR, working with States and other partners, with a view to facilitating its 
implementation in practice. The response, specifically designed for each situation, would 
promote an equitable sharing of responsibilities, entailing various specific contributions by States 
and international and non-governmental actors, based on good practices and tested approaches. 
It would also include measures to support the impact on host countries, including host 
communities, and refugees’ timely access to solutions (Turk & Garlick, 2016). As with the RCM, 
the CRRF ‘is not a new coordination mechanism, but rather builds on existing mechanisms’ 
(including the RCM).1 The CRRF is currently being piloted in the Somali refugee response. 
4. Host state capacity support lessons 
Issues 
Host state responsibilities 
Host states being primarily responsible for victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own 
borders is clearly recognised in international law (Harvey, 2009). The roles and responsibilities of 
states in relation to humanitarian aid are four-fold (Harvey, 2010): a) ‘calling’ a crisis and inviting 
international aid; b) providing assistance and protection themselves; c) monitoring and 
coordinating external assistance; d) setting the regulatory and legal frameworks governing 
assistance. The literature stresses the importance of host governments and the benefits of 
involving them in refugee responses, e.g. in identifying needs and how best to address them 
(Harvey, 2009; Fratzke, 2016). It is particularly important to involve local governments (Boustani 
et al, 2016). 
Challenges: lack of capacity 
However, host countries face several challenges in fulfilling their role of taking primary 
responsibility for refugee responses, notably: a) the majority of refugee populations are in 
developing countries, meaning that the burden of managing them falls disproportionately on the 
poor countries of the world, many already fragile states; b) host governments can themselves be 
parties to a conflict, or there could be concerns that aid might be used – or not used – to further 
political ends; c) host governments often lack capacity to coordinate a refugee response. 
‘Coordinating multiple actors can be extremely resource-intensive; often these resources do not 
exist or are needed elsewhere. Lack of capacity is particularly noticeable at a local, operational 
level’ (Savedra & Knox-Clarke, 2015: 27).    
                                                   
1 https://www.icvanetwork.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf 
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Bypassing the state in humanitarian responses 
As a result, despite the central role of host governments in law, the actual provision of assistance 
to refugees is mostly in the hands of UNHCR and other international agencies. The international 
model of humanitarian assistance is largely based on the implicit assumption that host 
governments are either too weak or too corrupt to manage large volumes of aid; hence aid 
agencies distribute it directly. Indeed, in some respects UNHCR has ‘essentially assumed some 
features of the state’: e.g. registering refugees, administering and managing camps (Harvey, 
2009: 10-11).  
The role of the state is also missing in humanitarian coordination. Surprisingly little attention has 
been paid to the way national governments structure and manage their responses to disaster, 
and their relations with international relief actors (Harvey, 2009: 5). A 2007 evaluation of the 
cluster system highlighted the lack of attention given to how systems for coordination of 
international aid actors relate to national governments (Harvey, 2010: 1).  
Signs of change: developing countries taking lead in response coordination 
There has been some change, though. ‘Wealthier developing countries are starting to claim 
greater control over responses to emergencies on their soil’ (Harvey, 2010: 1). Harvey (2010) 
attributes this to a number of factors: the increasing wealth of some developing countries, their 
growing willingness and ability to respond to disasters without external assistance and, in some 
cases, their emergence as providers of aid themselves. There are examples of countries taking 
the lead in coordinating assistance in a number of recent emergencies, notably the Ethiopian and 
Kenyan responses to the 2010-11 drought, Pakistan’s to the 2010 and 2011 floods, and the 
Philippines’ to Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 (Savedra & Knox-Clarke, 2015: 27). Indonesia’s 
experience in the wake of the 2004 Tsunami led it to ‘become increasingly assertive in its 
attempts to control relief activity, and the government has the capacity to play an effective 
coordinating and operational role, both at national and local level’ (Harvey, 2009: 34). However, 
this capacity has not always been consistent or reliable. 
Case study: Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon 
In the initial years of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Lebanese government was not in a position to 
manage the refugee response (Boustani et al, 2016; Kelley, 2017). This was therefore led by UN 
and other international agencies. Nonetheless, they needed government authority and approval 
to expand the refugee response, and this required helping to capacitate government leadership 
early on. Despite the early engagement, ‘coordination with the authorities remained a challenge 
given the many different government actors involved and the absence of detailed policy guidance 
being issued at the central level’ (Kelley, 2017: 91). 
UN and other agencies had to lead the refugee response in the absence of a national 
coordination strategy, and with poor knowledge of local conditions, a lack of mechanisms for 
regulating or coordinating responses, and dire urgent human needs which had to be addressed 
urgently (Boustani et al, 2016). Local authorities, in particular, at the frontline of dealing with the 
influx of refugees, lacked the capacity to mount a systematic response. International 
humanitarian agencies, facing funding and time constraints, found it difficult to develop and 
maintain long-term relationships with local authorities; they also often bypassed local authorities 
in order to avoid local bureaucracy and reduce the risk of aid being politicised (Boustani et al, 
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2016). The result was an initially ad hoc humanitarian response, marked by low efficiency and 
the inequitable and uneven distribution of aid (Boustani et al, 2016). 
Mansour (2017: 13-14) notes that in the MENA regional consultation meetings that took place 
ahead of the UN’s World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, civil society organizations 
advocated a ‘shift in focus from the international humanitarian system’s inward-looking 
coordination to an emphasis on shared ownership of humanitarian response between 
international, regional and domestic institutions’. He adds: ‘Regrettably there has been no such 
shift in the case of the Syria response in Lebanon. Syrian organizations and individuals in 
Lebanon are not represented at UN coordination meetings’. 
The Lebanese government did gradually take on a more active role in the refugee response. In 
2012, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) was officially designated by the Council of Ministers to 
be actively involved in the crisis response. MoSA stepped up its role by committing to co-leading 
sectoral meetings, and strengthening partnerships with international organisations in the 
response. In 2015, the government put forward the first Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP). 
Covering the period 2015-17, this was both a plan emphasising stabilisation and investment for 
host communities as well as refugees, and funding appeal setting out estimated costs for the 
plan. Despite the intervention of MoSA and numerous coordination efforts undertaken since the 
beginning of the crisis, Boustani et al (2016: 8) claim the mechanisms put in place have 
remained flaky. 
Lessons  
Humanitarian agencies need to ensure involvement of host states from the onset of a refugee 
crisis response. This includes both central government and local authorities. Where host 
government/actors lack capacity, aid agencies need to make efforts to build that capacity.  
Strengthening aid coordination 
Boustani et al (2017: 1) make a number of recommendations to strengthen aid collaboration in 
Lebanon, but many of these have wider application:  
▪ The central government should lead coordination of emergency responses at the national 
level and support the involvement of municipalities in local and regional coordination 
frameworks; 
▪ Humanitarian actors should make a far greater effort to coordinate with local authorities 
at the onset of crises and as emergencies unfold over the longer-term; 
▪ The central government and humanitarian agencies should promote medium- and long-
term programmes through government-led response plans to ensure greater 
coordination; 
▪ Humanitarian and aid organizations can better facilitate coordination across affected 
sectors within a defined geography by adopting area-based, spatial approaches, 
especially when addressing protracted crises in urban contexts. 
Building capacity 
Harvey (2009: 30) identifies multiple ways in which humanitarian agencies can strengthen 
national capacity: training, on-the-job learning, action research, coaching and mentoring, peer 
knowledge exchanges, participatory learning methods, knowledge networks and fairs, knowledge 
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sharing through collaborative projects, south-south knowledge exchange, community of practice 
approaches, and long-term supervision. [See examples below.] 
As noted above, ‘increasingly strong states with their own significant resources are moving 
towards a different model of collaboration with national and international humanitarian actors’ 
(Harvey, 2009: 34). However, persistent issues with capacity (not always consistent or reliable) 
suggest the need for ‘smart alignment’ where agencies ‘make a careful assessment of 
government capacity in advance of crises and develop strategies to build government capacity to 
coordinate and respond; work in line with government priorities and approaches; and substitute 
or complement government capacity where there are gaps or weaknesses’ (Harvey, 2009: 34). 
Examples of capacity building measures 
Listed below are some examples of humanitarian agencies supporting national capacity building, 
albeit to respond effectively to disasters rather than specifically to manage a refugee crisis 
(Harvey, 2009: 30-33). These could provide models for building host state capacity for refugee 
response coordination:  
▪ In southern Sudan, Save the Children gave particular attention to collaboration with the 
local government, building relationships of personal trust with local officials and keeping 
them informed and involved in planning activities. This process was not easy and the 
agency had to invest additional staff time and resources to work with local government 
partners; 
▪ During the response to Tropical Storm Stan in Guatemala in 2005, national officials 
worked closely with staff from the Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in 
Central America (CEPREDENAC) and drew heavily on a regional manual developed by 
CEPREDENAC for practical guidance on handling international aid and personnel; 
▪ As part of efforts to protect and assist conflict-affected civilians in Sri Lanka, UNHCR 
addressed capacity constraints at central and district levels by placing key personnel 
within ministries and providing direct institutional support to the National Human Rights 
Commission; 
▪ In Afghanistan, UNDP has provided experts to work with the government’s Aid 
Coordination Unit; 
▪ In Southeast Asia, cooperation in disaster management is institutionalised through the 
ASEAN Experts Group, and ASEAN played an important coordination role in the 
response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. 
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